Unshackle Academia and Allow It to Exemplify the Purpose of Patent Law:  To Promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts by Mohr, Joseph
Marquette Law Review
Volume 88
Issue 3 Winter 2004 Article 4
Unshackle Academia and Allow It to Exemplify the
Purpose of Patent Law: "To Promote the Progress
of Science and the Useful Arts"
Joseph Mohr
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Joseph Mohr, Unshackle Academia and Allow It to Exemplify the Purpose of Patent Law: "To Promote the Progress of Science and the Useful
Arts", 88 Marq. L. Rev. 671 (2004).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol88/iss3/4
UNSHACKLE ACADEMIA AND ALLOW IT TO
EXEMPLIFY THE PURPOSE OF PATENT LAW: "TO
PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND THE
USEFUL ARTS"'
I. INTRODUCTION
A patentee's right to exclude nonprofit academic use of his invention,2
without exception for experimental use,3 is inconsistent with the patent law
purpose of promoting science and innovation 4 because royalty deterrents arise
that hinder scientific progress in nonprofit academic institutions. This tension
in patent policy is most evident with nonprofit research universities that
constantly tread in the realm of patented technology to explore the forefront of
scientific knowledge. 5 Historically, the experimental use defense, a common
law affirmative defense to patent infringement when the alleged infringing use
involves mere experimentation, 6  provided universities using patented
technology for research purposes some level of protection.7 Modem decisions,
however, have sharply curtailed the applicability of the experimental use
defense for universities today.8
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2003) (detailing patent infringement).
3. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. "The Congress shall have Power To... promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries .. " Id.
5. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
6. See DONALD CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1204
(2d ed. 2001) (discussing recent applications of the experimental use defense).
7. See Jennifer Miller, Sealing the Coffin on the Experimental Use Exception, 2003 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 12 (2003).
8. See Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362 (alleged experimental "use is disqualified from the defense if it
has the 'slightest commercial implication"'); Soitec v. Silicon Genesis Corp., 81 Fed. Appx. 734, 737
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (refusing to distinguish between use of patented technology at
the "research and development stage" versus the "manufacturing stage"); Embrex, Inc. v. Serv.
Eng'g. Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("constru[ing] both the experimental use and de
minimus exceptions very narrowly"); Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding experimental use defense ineffective when the alleged scientific "inquiry
has definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes"). With regard to the
experimental use defense, the Federal Circuit Madey court held that:
[R]egardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged in an endeavor for
commercial gain, so long as the act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate
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This Comment explores three issues pertaining to scientific progress in
nonprofit research universities: Part II discusses how the government,
universities, and private industry often partner to conduct collaborative
research that benefits each partnership member and concurrently promotes
scientific progress; Part III explores the effect that the Federal Circuit's
narrow interpretation of the experimental use defense 9 has on scientific
progress; and Part IV suggests reforms that will allow universities to advance
science, while at the same time fairly compensating patent owners for the use
of their patented technology.
II. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACADEMIC, PRIVATE, AND PUBLICLY
FUNDED RESEARCH
While at one time universities, private industry, and the government
mostly conducted research independently, today they commonly engage in
collaborative research efforts.' Indeed, "[t]he chasm separating universities
from industry and basic research from applied research now is bridged
routinely."' " The trend towards partnerships appears likely to continue as
evidenced by a recent 20% increase in industry-sponsored research conducted
by universities from 1991 to 1997.12 The impetus for this trend was the
government's initial collaboration with research universities to develop
advantageous wartime technology.
3
A. Government and Academic Collaborative Research Efforts
The government significantly increased public funding for research at
universities in the 1940s due to World War II pressures for improved
medicines, materials, and weaponry. 14  The success of the collaboration
prompted a continued policy of publicly funding academic research with
formal oversight by such government agencies as the Office of Naval
Research, the National Institutes of Health, and the National Science
Foundation. 15 While this scheme was effective at producing innovations, 6 the
business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited
experimental use defense.
Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
9. See id
10. See Kenneth Dueker, Biobusiness On Campus: Commercialization Of University-
Developed Biomedical Technologies, 52 FOOD DRUG L.J. 453 (1997).
li. Id.
12. PORT ET AL., LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 177 (1999).
13. Dueker, supra note 10, at 459-60.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 460.
[88:671
PA TENT LA W
fact that the government held ownership rights over the resulting patents led
to inefficient use of the innovations: the government's role was not to
commercially exploit innovations, and private industry was hesitant to license
patents held by the government.' 7 As a result, many useful innovations that
were developed at universities with public funding failed to achieve their full
potential to benefit the public. 18
In 1980, congressional discontent with innovations developed at the
public's expense going unutilized, coupled with a perceived decline in the
United States' output of new innovations, prompted Congress to pass the
University and Small Business Patent Procedure Act, 19 commonly referred to
as the Bayh-Dole Act.20 The Bayh-Dole Act allows a nonprofit institution,
university, or small business to retain title to patents associated with publicly
funded inventions that result from its research in collaboration with a federal
agency.21 Although a university's right to retain title to patents that arise from
its publicly funded research is subject to certain limits, 22 the Act confers
substantial incentives to commercialize any resulting inventions.23 The
incentives to commercialize new inventions arise because universities, which
now hold patent ownership rights, may license the inventions to private
industry at mutually beneficial financial terms.24
Today, the government and university collaborative research effort
remains strong.25 The National Science Foundation ("NSF") partners with
over 2000 universities, nonprofit institutions, and small business to conduct
research in mostly physical science and engineering fields of inquiry.26 To
fund the research at these institutions, the NSF spends approximately $150
million per year, which represents approximately 3.8% of the United States'
16. See generally National Institute of Health, Selected Research Advances of NIH, at
http://history.nih.gov/history/advances.htm (historical sampling of National Institute of Health
advances and innovations) (last visited Sept. 2004).
17. Dueker, supra note 10, at 460.
18. Id. at 460-61.
19. Id.
20. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980), amended by Pub. L. No. 98-620
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 200 et seq.).
21. PORTETAL., supra note 12, at 183.
22. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980), amended by Pub. L. No. 98-620
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 200 et seq.).
23. PORT ET AL., supra note 12, at 181
24. Id.
25. National Science Foundation, NSF By the Numbers (reporting data that pertains to National
Science Foundation annual funding and its general allocation of funds), at
http://www.nsfgov/od/lpa/nsf50/nsfnumbers.htm (last visited Sept. 2004).
26. Id.
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annual budget.27 Indeed, major research universities depend on federal public
funding for approximately 87% of their research budgets.28
Collaborative efforts between the government and universities represent
just one facet of modem collaborative research. 29  Research partnerships
between private industry and nonprofit research universities are also prevalent
today. 30 Furthermore, partnerships between private industry and research
universities sometimes function to link private industry and the government
into collaborative research initiatives.3 '
B. Private Industry and Academic Collaborative Research Efforts
For most of this nation's history, technology transfer between academia
and private industry was mainly accomplished by indirect and informal
means.32 While a few private industry pioneers explored formal collaboration
with university research departments prior to World War 11, 33 the impetus for
increased private involvement in academic research was the government's
attempt to gamer scientific progress through its cooperation with research
universities.34 Specifically, the inherent inefficiencies, discussed in Part II.A,
which plagued the government's efforts to realize commercial applications for
the innovations developed under its direction led to reforms that brought
private industry and academia closer together.35
1. Legal Development of Research Partnerships Between Private Industry
and Academia
A researcher's prestige among the scientific community was the main
driving force behind technology transfer prior to the mid-twentieth century.36
Publication of scientific advancements in journals and presentation of
27. Id.
28. Dueker, supra note 10, at 457 (citing the Association of University Technology Managers,
AUTM Licensing Survey, FY 1991-FY 1995: A Five-Year Survey Summary of Technology
Licensing (And Related) Performance For U.S. And Canadian Academic And Nonprofit Institutions,
And Patent Management Firms 28 (1997)).
29. See PORT ET AL., supra note 12, at 180
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Clovia Hamilton, University Technology Transfer And Economic Development:
Proposed Cooperative Economic Development Agreements Under The Bayh-Dole Act, 36 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 397, 398-405 (2003).
33. Dueker, supra note 10, at 456-57 (discussing the University of Wisconsin's creation of the
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation to financially exploit scientific advances created by its
professors); see also Hamilton, supra note 32, at 400.
34. See generally Hamilton, supra note 32.
35. Dueker, supra note 10, at 460.
36. See Hamilton, supra note 32, at 402.
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advances at scientific conferences were the researcher's main means of
demonstrating his or her accomplishments and advancing his or her career.37
These publications and presentations also provided private industry with a
source of new knowledge that it could then develop into commercially viable
innovations. 38 This system, therefore, was mutually beneficial for both the
academic researcher and the private commercial entity; however, it did not
directly confer benefits between the parties in a formal manner as the
intellectual property system does today.
Formal licensing and cooperative research investments dictate technology
transfer today.39 To rectify the inefficient utilization of innovations created
through public funding,40 Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act4' and the
Stevenson-Wydler Act.42 The combined effect of these Acts was to vest
patent ownership in universities for patents arising from their federally funded
research, which the universities could license to private industry.43
Furthermore, the Acts "enable[] cooperative research and development
agreements (so-called CRADAs) between government owned laboratories,
industry, and academia. ''44 Notable examples of post Bayh-Dole collaboration
structures between universities, private industry, and the government include
licensing agreements, industry sponsored university research, spin-off
companies, and idea labs.45
Undoubtedly, research partnerships between the government, universities,
and private industry have become ubiquitous in modem research.46 The
extensiveness of such partnerships today did not result because the
government thrust this system upon universities and private industry, but
rather the partnership system developed because it was mutually beneficial to
all partnership members.47
37. Id.
38. Id. at 403.
39. PORTETAL., supra note 12, at 178-184.
40. See id.
41. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980), amended by Pub. L. No. 98-620 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 200 et seq.).
42. Id.
43. PORT ET AL., supra note 12, at 182-85.
44. Id. at 182.
45. Joshua A. Newburg & Richard L. Dunn, Keeping Secrets in the Campus Lab: Law, Values
and Rules of Engagement for Industry-University R&D Partnerships, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 187, 200-06
(2002) (defining and discussing the following collaboration structures: licensing, industry sponsored
university research, spin-off companies, and idea labs).
46. See generally id. at 188.
47. Id. at 197-98.
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2. Benefits and Advantages
The industry-university research partnership yields many advantages for
the partnership as well as for society.4 8 When private industry sponsors
research at a university, it benefits from the scientific horsepower that
universities provide. Universities provide dedicated research facilities, filled
with some of the brightest minds in a given field, to direct toward a particular
research effort. In addition, graduate students, to satisfy academic
requirements, contribute considerable hours of skilled research at a fraction of
the cost that privately paid researchers would demand. Partnering with a
university allows a private company to reduce its overhead expenditures for
lab equipment and personnel, while at the same time having its research
directives pursued by highly educated pioneers in the field.
Likewise, universities benefit from industry sponsored research initiatives
because the research often serves concurrent educational and commercial
purposes.49 The universities' ability to retain ownership of patents arising
from their research and their subsequent licensing of that technology have
generated more than twenty billion dollars in revenue for universities since
the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act.5 ° Undoubtedly, industry sponsored
research aims to produce commercial innovations, but most often the research
also has educational and academic value for the universities. For example, a
drug company may fund research at a university to develop a new cancer
drug. The research provides students with an opportunity to learn aspects of
pharmaceutical research and provides professors with an opoortunity to report
the new drug's effect on cancer cells in academic journals. Thus, industry
sponsored research can yield new innovations for private industry while
concurrently allowing universities to pursue their academic mission.
Additionally, universities benefit from research partnerships by raising
revenue from licensing the innovations that they discover.5 1 Depending on
specific research agreements, universities may maintain the right to patent the
products of their research, whether the research was backed by public, private,
52
or their own funds. Universities can use this revenue to purchase lab
facilities and equipment that would normally require higher tuitions or other
means to pay for them. Revenue derived from innovation licensing, therefore,
48. Id. at 197-98.
49. Id. at 197 (describing the different benefits universities receive by partnering with'industry:
"(1) access to industry resources including financial support and advanced technology; (2) superior
training and placement opportunities for students; (3) the stimulation of exposure to current industry
problems; and (4) income from commercially valuable inventions").
50. Ducker, supra note 10, at 453.
51. See id.
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can potentially support continued university research initiatives.53
While universities may receive royalties from collaboration with private
industry, such royalties are generally of limited significance. 54 "'[W]ith one
or two exceptions, even the most successful university licensing offices
receive licensing revenue equal to 1 or 2% of their universities' total research
budgets.'"55 Even the universities lucky enough to receive a percent or two of
their research budget through collaboration with private industry "'rely on
single "'blockbuster"' patents for the majority of their revenue.' ' 56 Thus,
while universities may hope to receive funding sufficient to cover certain
research expenses that further both commercial and educational goals, they
are highly unlikely to substantially profit from industry-university
collaborations.
Finally, society benefits from research partnerships because of the
partnerships' role as an economic stimulant.57 "Economic research over the
past sixty years has amply demonstrated the causal link between intellectual
property and the growth of our national economy. 58 Indeed, as the United
States manufacturing industry continues to decline due to cheaper overseas
labor, its economy must rely more on intellectual property rights associated
with new innovations that it develops. 59  "Intellectual property is an
increasingly critical component of the United States capital and foreign trade
and economic research has demonstrated that changes in intellectual property
laws can be used deliberately to promote innovation and national economic
development." 60  Congress itself found that "[t]echnology and industrial
innovation are central to the economic, environmental, and social well-being
of citizens of the United States.",61  Therefore, the industry-university
collaboration structure's ability to foster innovation is instrumental to
62continued vitality of the United States economy.
The many benefits that derive from industry-university collaborations,
however, need to be viewed in conjunction with some of the potential
disadvantages that may result from such partnerships.
55. See id.
56. Id. at 466
57. Id. (quoting Lita Nelsen, The Lifeblood of Biotechnology: University-Industry Technology
Transfer, in THE BUSINESS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY: FROM THE BENCH TO THE STREET 39, 44 (R. Dana
Ono ed., 1991)).
58. Dueker, supra note 10, at 466.
57. See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 59.
58. Id
59. See generally id.
60. Id
61. 15 U.S.C. § 3701 (2003).
62. See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 59.
2004]
MARQUETTE LA WREVIEW
3. Disadvantages and Challenges
Heavy funding of research at universities can potentially bias the research
results in favor of the industry providing the funding. 63 A study by the Yale
University School of Medicine called into question the impartiality of
biomedical research conducted at a number of universities that was funded by
the pharmaceutical industry.64 The study indicated "that research backed by
[the pharmaceutical] industry was three times more likely to arrive at pro[-]
industry conclusions than studies without such backing. 65  The
disproportionate "pro[-]industry" research results, if actually caused by bias,
may derive from unethical manipulation of data, or may derive slightly more
innocuously from an initial "pro[-]industry" design of research studies.66 At a
minimum, academic research heavily funded by industry runs the risk that the
public will perceive it as biased in favor of industry.67
In addition; differing goals and mindsets pose continuing challenges for
industry and university research partnerships. "Universities are bastions of
academic freedom and open discourse" ;68 conversely, industry seeks focused
and secretive technological advances to procure a competitive advantage in
the marketplace.69 While private industry is interested in research that is
likely to lead to profitable commercial applications, "[u]niversities seek the
advancement of knowledge for knowledge's sake.,, 70 These differing goals
can lead to disagreements as to the direction that research should proceed, as
well as disagreements concerning how much of the researchers' time and
resources should be applied to the collaborative aspects of the research.71
A further challenge results from industry-university research partnerships
when researchers are pressured by universities they work for to pursue
industry sponsored research, rather than research directed towards their
particular academic interests.72 Researcher discontentment is particularly
relevant because many researchers choose lower-paying academic positions
instead of positions in industry to maintain their freedom to pursue their
63. Charles Hirshberg, Ties With Drug Companies Bias Biomedical Research, DISCOVER, Jan.
2004, at 71.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. A "pro-industry" design to a research study is a design that sets up the industrial
product to perform well. Id. An example would be "comparing a medication against a placebo...
instead of comparing it with its most effective competitors." Id.
67. Hirshberg, supra note 63, at 71.
68. PORT ET AL., supra note 12, at 177.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Newburg & Dunn, supra note 45, at 198-99.
72. Hamilton, supra note 32, at 399.
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intellectual interests.73 Thus, universities must strive to balance their
researchers' intellectual drive and job satisfaction with the need to allocate
human research resources towards industry-sponsored programs that provide
financial support for the universities.
While the many benefits of industry-university research partnerships may
be tempered somewhat by certain disadvantages,74 these disadvantages pale in
comparison to the detrimental effect that the modem experimental use
jurisprudence has on scientific progress. 75
III. THE MODERN INTERPRETATION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL USE DEFENSE
AND ITS EFFECT ON SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS
Courts construe the experimental use defense narrowly to the benefit of
patent holders and to the detriment of research institutions and the public in
general.76 At one time, "there [was] a line of authority suggesting that use of
a patented product for non-commercial, experimental purposes [was] not...
an act of infringement., 77  Under modem decisions, however, free use of
patented technology for research is prohibited unless the use is solely "for
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry. 78
A recent decision regarding the experimental use defense by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Madey v. Duke University,79 weighs heavily
against effective use of patented technology by research universities.8° One
commentator aptly describes Madey as "[s]ealing the [c]offin on the
[e]xperimental [u]se [e]xception.' The Madey decision reiterates and
73. See Karen Kreeger, Research in the Business World (Oct. 16, 2000) (discussing the
"perceived lack of freedom that people mention time after time when comparing scientific research in
a university lab versus a company lab" and comparing the "supposed freedom in academia" with the
larger amounts of resources found in private business labs), available at http://www.the-
scientist.com/yr2000/oct/prof 00 101 6.html .""labs) (last visited Sept. 2004); Nathan Dykes,
Statement on a new Faculty Title: Clinical Professorship (discussing the benefits of an academic
position versus private practice despite "the perception, and perhaps reality, that private veterinary
practice is more lucrative, less demanding, more organized, [and] less stressful, compared with a
University position"), at http://web.comell.edu/UniversityFaculty/forums/Dykes
statment.pdf (last visited Sept. 2004).
74. Hirschberg, supra note 63, at 71.
75. See generally Miller, supra note 7.
76. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (interpreting the
experimental use defense to be narrow and limited); Soitec v. Silicon Genesis Corp., 81 Fed. Appx.
734, 737 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (refusing to distinguish between use of patented
technology at the "research and development stage" versus the "manufacturing stage").
77. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 5, at 1204.
78. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362; Soitec, 81 Fed. Appx. at 737 (unpublished opinion).
79. 307 F.3d 1351.
80. See id at 1351-64.
81. Miller, supra note 7, at 12.
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expands the Federal Circuit's staunch position against an experimental use
exception for universities from a patent holder's general right to exclude.82
A. Madey v. Duke University
In Madey, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that the experimental
use defense did not apply to Duke University's potentially infringing use of
patented technology.83 Duke employed Madey to run a free electron laser lab
that included laser equipment patented by Madey.84  Years later,
disagreements between Duke and Madey resulted in Duke removing Madey
as lab director; however, Duke continued to use the laser equipment over
which Madey held patents.85 When Madey sued for patent infringement, the
lower court determined that Madey failed to establish that Duke was using the
equipment for purposes other than mere nonprofit experimentation; thus, it
granted Duke's motion for summary judgment of non-infringement.86 The
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, however, closed the door to the lower
court's reasonable approach to the experimental use exception. 87 It declared
that Madey did not have to establish that Duke used the patented technology
for profit oriented purposes and reversed that portion of the lower court's
dismissal of Madey's patent infringement claims against Duke.
88
The Madey court found that distinctions between commercial research and
theoretical, non-commercial research are immaterial with regard to the
experimental use defense. 89 "[R]egardless of whether a particular institution
or entity is engaged in an endeavor for commercial gain," 90 the experimental
use defense does not apply if the institution's endeavor furthers its legitimate
business, such as theoretical research.91 Apparently, the experimental use
defense applies only to trivial uses, such as for amusement, satisfaction of idle
curiosity, or strict philosophical inquiry, which are inconsistent with research
universities' role in pursuing higher learning.92 Thus, the Federal Circuit's
narrow interpretation of the experimental use defense significantly impacts
research universities and affects their ability to further scientific progress.93
82. Id.
83. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362-63.
84. Id. at 1352.
85. Id. at 1352-53.
86. Id. at 1356.
87. Id. at 1361-63
88. Id. at 1362-63.
89. Id. at 1362.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Tom Saunders, Case Comment: Renting Space on the Shoulders of Giants: Madey and the
[88:671
PA TENT LA W
B. Application of the Madey Decision
Scientific progress occurs when new ideas are presented and accepted by
the scientific community. First, the new idea is evaluated, probed, and
scrutinized by the scientific community; then, if the scientific community
generally accepts the idea, it is considered legitimate.9 4 Only after that
process is fully undertaken can a new idea be considered sufficiently solid to
serve as a rung in the ladder of scientific progress that allows others to climb
higher.
1. The Federal Circuit's Differing Treatment of Research Universities and
Individuals
The Madey decision circumscribes a vital group from the scientific
progress equation with regard to patents, namely research universities. 95 A
substantial portion of the scientific community pursue academic careers at
research universities, yet "[t]he practical effect of the Madey decision is to
draw an artificial line between experiments conducted by individuals and
experiments conducted by university researchers. 96 Indeed, Madey precludes
researchers at universities from freely experimenting with patented
technology while it allows individuals to do so in certain instances.
97
Placing individuals under the ambit of the experimental use exception and
excluding research universities, which are in a prime position to extend
existing scientific boundaries, is antithetical to the purpose of patent law.
Granted, individuals not affiliated with a research institution who tinker in
fields of interest to them comprise some small fraction of the scientific
community, but they generally lack the resources necessary to make
significant contributions to scientific progress. With these resource
limitations in mind, society expects research universities to contribute the
lion's share of time and effort to achieve scientific progress. But Madey
Future of the Experimental Use Doctrine, 113 YALE L.J. 261, 265 (2003).
94. See Lambert Dolphin, Steps in the Scientific Method (May 2, 1992), at
http://www.ldolphin.org/ SciMeth2.html (last visited Sept. 2004).
95. See Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362-63.
96. Saunders, supra note 93, at 265.
97. See Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362-63. For example, I suggest an individual testing a patented
invention to determine how it worked could more easily allege that his experimentation was to satisfy
such personal interests as idle curiosity, amusement, or philosophical inquiry than could an employee
in a research institution because employees generally are not paid to satisfy personal interests. Even
if the individual's and employee's goal was the same-to advance science-and the research project
had "no commercial application whatsoever," the Federal Circuit would still preclude the research
university from using the experimental use defense based on its conclusion that research projects
"unmistakably further the institution's legitimate business objectives, including educating and
enlightening students and faculty participating in these projects" and that they further "increase the
status of the institution and lure lucrative research grants, students and faculty." Id. at 1362.
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precludes research universities from freely using an important research tool,
patented technology, to achieve the scientific progress expected of them.
98
Patents are laden with useful scientific information and discoveries, which
makes them essential to expanding scientific thresholds. "The information
contained in patents is a major source of scientific as well as technologic
knowledge. Indeed, in many areas of technology, technical information is not
published outside of patent documents." 99  Therefore, decisions such as
Madey, which affect patent law, also affect general scientific knowledge part
and parcel.
2. The Madey Decision's Effect on Scientific Progress
The overall effect of the Madey decision is to reduce the patent law
system's potential to promote scientific progress. In multiple different ways,
Madey precludes academia from utilizing, for the public benefit, the science
contained within patents.' 00
First, Madey undercuts the value of the specification requirement
0
'
necessary to obtain a patent.'0 2 The specification requirement is intimately
related to the patent law purpose of promoting the useful arts: inventions
granted patents must be described in sufficient detail to ensure that the public
benefits scientifically from the new knowledge underlying the patented
invention.10 3 The persons, other than the inventor himself, most able to
understand new inventions, as described in a patent specification, are often
academic researchers.' 0 4  Denying academic researchers the opportunity to
freely experiment with patented inventions hinders their ability to fully
understand new inventions and to subsequently pass on that new knowledge
98. See id.
99. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
100. See generally Saunders, supra note 93.
101. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003) (describing the written description, enablement, best mode, and
definiteness disclosure requirements to obtain a patent). The specification requirement reads as
follows:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable
any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected,
to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor
carrying out his invention.
Id.
102. Saunders, supra note 93, at 265-66.
103. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003).
104. Saunders, supra note 93, at 265-66.
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to their students.'0 5 Therefore, Madey interferes with the patent law purpose
of passing on the knowledge contained in patents to persons skilled in the
relevant art. 
106
Second, Madey removes a substantial source of patent peer review that is
useful for confirming the validity and accuracy of a patent's claims. 0 7 The
Patent and Trademark Office is inundated with new patent applications every
year and this significant burden prevents it from thoroughly testing all aspects
of patent claims. 0 8 Research universities are better suited to fully explore the
limits of a patent and could review a patent's claims in conjunction with their
own research initiatives. Ensuring that patent claims are valid allows business
and academia to more fully rely on patents for their respective financial and
scientific pursuits.
Finally, additional beneficial uses of the patented technology unknown to
the patent holder, but known to others, are trapped by the patent under
Madey. 12 When a researcher knows that patented technology is useful in an
area not considered by the patent holder, such technology may fail to be
utilized because Madey prevents the researcher from experimenting with the
patented technology." 0 This result can potentially trap lifesaving advances,
such as when Immunex patented a protein it only knew was useful for
enhancing general immune system function."' Had a research group from
England not further researched Immunex's patented protein, its drug resistant
cancer fighting properties may not have been discovered.12
In short, Madey hinders scientific progress in the United States by
interfering with research universities' ability to use patented technology for
nonprofit research purposes. At least one other country, with acute interests
in fostering innovation, has rejected the Madey court's line of reasoning in
favor of systems with broader experimental use allowances. 113
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See 2002 USPTO Performance & Accountability Rep. for Fiscal Year 2002, at 17,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2002/1lowres/l-58.pdf (last visited Mar.
10, 2004). The USPTO received 333,688 patent applications in 2002 and it employed 3538 patent
examiners to process all of the patent applications. Id.
109. Saunders, supra note 93 at 265-66.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 266 n.26.
112. Id.
113. Jennifer Johnson, Comment, The Experimental Use Exception In Japan: A Model For U.S.
Patent Law?, 12 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 499, 510-511 (2003) (discussing Japan's patent law
system).
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C. The Experimental Use Exception in Japan as an Alternative
In contrast to the United States, researchers in Japan may use patented
technology for noncommercial research purposes.' 14 Japan designed its patent
law system to encourage innovation and scientific progress because, at the
time it designed the system, it lagged scientifically behind the world." 5
Interestingly, Japan and the United States share the same goal of fostering
scientific progress, yet they take diametrically opposed positions to the
experimental use defense." 6 One need only look at an electronics store or a
car dealership to determine that Japan's patent law system and its application
of the experimental use defense continues to yield considerable innovation.
Indeed, "[i]n Japan, where a general statutory experimental use exception has
been in place for over one hundred years, inventive activity is growing at an
exceptional rate."
'
"
17
The Japanese patent system includes a statutory exception to patent
infringement for experimental use that provides significantly more protection
to Japanese researchers experimenting with patented technology than exists in
the United States. 1 8 Specifically, the Japanese Patent Law states "the effects
of the patent right shall not extend to the working of the patent right for the
purposes of experiment or research." 119  The fact that the Japanese
experimental use exception derives from a statute, whereas the United States'
general experimental use defense derives from the common law, 120 indicates
that the experimental use exception is more binding in Japanese courts than it
is in American courts. In Japan, courts seem to interpret the experimental use
exception to require only that the research result in a technological advance,
but even that limited element has not been consistently required by Japanese
114. Id.
115. Id
116. Compare Johnson, supra note 113, at 519 (discussing Japan's expansive experimental use
exception), with Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the
experimental use defense in the United States is extremely narrow and strictly limited).
117. Johnson, supra note 113, at 532.
118. Id. at 519-520 (noting that the Japanese experimental use exception applies to all forms of
research and experimentation, whereas the United State's common law experimental use defense is
construed extremely narrowly and its ancillary statutory experimental use exception, 35 U.S.C. §
271(e)(1), applies only to generic pharmaceutical manufacturers for testing in preparation for FDA
regulatory requirements).
119. Id at 510 (quoting Tokkyoho [Patent L.], Law No. 121 of Apr. 13, 1959 (Japan), amended
by Law No. 24 of Apr. 17, 2002 (Japan), art. 67(2), translated in JAPANESE LAWS RELATING TO
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY (Japanese Patent Office trans., 1996)).
120. Id. Of course, the generic drug approval experimental use provision of 35 U.S.C. §
271(e)(1) is a statutory experimental use provision, but since it is limited only to the pharmaceutical
industry, it does not approach the inclusiveness of Japan's statutory experimental use exception. See
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courts.
12 1
Japan's patent system demonstrates that proper tailoring of an
experimental use exception for nonprofit research universities can be an
effective means of promoting scientific progress and innovation.' 22  Like
Japan, the United States would benefit from increased scientific progress and
innovation if Congress improved the patent laws by including a statutory
experimental use defense to patent infringement for nonprofit research
universities.
IV. PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS
To promote scientific progress, the experimental use exception should be
revised and expanded. Congress should incorporate a wholesale exception to
patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271 for nonprofit university research.
The exception should give nonprofit universities wide latitude to use patented
technology to conduct their research; however, to protect the patentee's
property interest in his patent, the exception should entitle the patentee to an
interest in any subsequent innovations or patents directly attributable to a
university's use of his patent.
23
The patentee's interest in innovations developed by a university's use of
his patented technology under the modified experimental use exception
should be proportional to his patent's contribution to the innovation. This
scheme may be characterized as a "reach-through" royalty scheme whereby
"the true value of the patented [technology] will be determined by the ultimate
marketplace success of the new product developed through use of the
[patented technology]."' 124 The patentee's interest would be a function of the
fraction of his invention utilized by the university in relation to the fraction of
other patented inventions also utilized.'25 Additionally, the patentee's interest
would be a function of how much the university research was responsible for
the subsequent innovation.' 26  This scheme would shift the university's
financial burden to pay royalties to the back end of the research process, as
compared to the current front end scheme of paying royalties initially to use
121. Id. at 517-18 (discussing the Japanese court's inconsistent application of the technological
advance requirement with experimental use in the pharmaceutical industry and other inventions).
122. See id at 519, 532.
123. See generally Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking The Experimental
Use Exception To Patent Infringement For Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 62
(2001).
124. Id. at 61-62.
125. See id. at 62.
126. This Comment does not propose to define exactly how the courts would determine the
patentee's interest, but rather it suggests that the concept would be feasible and would better balance
the interests of promoting science and protecting a patent owner's interest.
2004]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
patented technology. 27  Furthermore, the scheme would also require
universities to pay royalties only for the use of patented technology that
resulted in economically useful innovations.
28
These proposed changes would provide researchers with the freedom to
advance science while compensating the patent owners whose patents fulfilled
the purpose of patent law. The science advanced would be both theoretical
and innovative: (1) without front end royalty costs, researchers would be more
free to advance theoretical fields of science because they would have less
obligation to pursue commercially useful inventions to recoup licensing
expenses paid when using patented technology and (2) royalty costs shifted to
the back end and limited to the patented technology that the university
actually advanced into new commercial innovations would decrease deterrents
to innovative research.129  The public would benefit from these changes
because they would allow universities to efficiently devote their time and
resources towards advancing science beyond existing thresholds of
knowledge defined by then existing patented technology. In sum, a system
that fosters research to advance science and innovation has marked
advantages over the current system, which too often impedes science and
innovation.
A. Benefits to Theoretical Research
Theoretical science would benefit from these proposed changes because
universities currently have little financial incentive to pursue science that will
not lead to immediately useful innovations. With the inherent high cost,
delay, and inconvenience a university incurs when it uses patented technology
for research,1 30 researchers may be pressured into pursuing research that will
result in commercially viable inventions. This pressure diverts research
efforts away from pure, theoretical fields that are unlikely to have immediate
economic applications, but yet may yield future quantum leaps in scientific
advancement.
Theoretical research is essential to science and mankind's well-being.
Even when such research does not appear to offer the marketplace practical
applications, it can open the door to innovations beyond current
comprehension. How can society begin to measure the effects Newton's
Laws of Mechanics have had on all subsequent scientific progress? More
127. See Mueller, supra note 123, at 62.
128. Id.
129. Id
130. See Eyal H. Barash, Comment, Experimental Uses, Patents, and Scientific Progress, 91
NW. U. L. REv. 667, 698-700 (1997).
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recently, the world community's effort to combat the SARS virus provides an
example extolling theoretical research:
Coronaviruses had never been associated with lethal diseases in
humans before. Nevertheless, work on those viruses had been
supported by the National Institutes of Health and other places, so
we knew quite a bit about this family of viruses before the outbreak,
which meant we were in a better position to make vaccines that
could prevent another outbreak. If basic research hadn't been done,
SARS would have been a much more serious threat.
131
By allowing nonprofit universities uninhibited use of patented technology
to push the boundaries of current scientific theories, which may or may not
yield immediate economically useful inventions, the patent system would
promote, rather than hinder, scientific progress.
B. Benefits to Innovative Research
Granting nonprofit universities the freedom to use patented technology
will promote innovation by eliminating deterrents to research that arise when
universities must pay royalties to explore paths that later turn out to be dead-
ends. 132 When a university must pay a license fee to use ten different patented
technologies, but only succeeds in advancing the technology of one of them, it
likely incurs a financial loss. The loss occurs even though the university may
receive a reasonable royalty for the invention it creates because it has paid at
least a ieasonable royalty rate133 for each of the ten patented technologies it
used to achieve that one invention. Because scientific research, by its very
nature, abounds with unsuccessful pursuits, the imposition of royalty fees for
use of patented technologies that never result in useful inventions creates a
deterrent to pursuing the research in the first place.134  If a university,
however, were free to use all ten patented technologies for research, paying a
royalty only for its use of the one patent that it successfully advanced into a
useful, new innovation, the university would have promoted science it may
have otherwise been deterred from pursuing, and the deserving patentee
would be justly compensated. 135
131. Barry Yeomen, SARS Storm Spurs Surprising Strategies, DISCOVER, Jan. 2004, at 50
(quoting Robert Garry, a virologist from Tulane University School of Medicine).
132. See Mueller, supra note 123, at 61-63.
133. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2003) (defining patent infringement damages); see Donald Ware,
Research Tool Patents: Judicial Remedies, 30 AIPLA Q. J. 267, 280 (2002).
134. See Mueller, supra note 123, at 61-63.
135. Id.
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Under this system, universities could strive to advance science without
reinventing the wheel. To acquire patent protection, the patentee must
disclose his invention. 36 The disclosure requirement aims to allow the public
to derive the benefit of the patentee's scientific contribution.
13 7
The patent statute requires full disclosure of the invention .... Such
details would be idle and purposeless if this information cannot be
used for 17-20 years. Indeed, there would be little value in the
requirement.., if the information is then placed on ice and protected
from further study and research investigation. To the contrary, the
patent system both contemplates and facilitates research into patented
subject matter, whether the purpose is scientific understanding or
evaluation or comparison or improvement. Such activities are integral
to the advance of technology.1
38
Allowing a university to make full use of this knowledge through
experimentation, without the front end hassles of royalty negotiations, 39
would encourage researchers to take patented technology forward towards
new and improved innovations. 14
0
However, under Madey, a university researcher is dissuaded from
experimenting with patented technology because he does not qualify for the
experimental use exception.' 41  Thus, financial pressures encourage a
university researcher to inefficiently work around patented technology in an
attempt to understand the principles they contain in a non-infringing manner,
rather than more efficiently using inventions as they are disclosed. 142 In her
dissent in Integra Lifesciences, Judge Newman lamented the public loss of
valuable knowledge caused by narrow interpretation of the experimental use
defense:
The requirement of disclosure of the details of patented inventions
facilitates further knowledge and understanding of what was done by
the patentee, and may lead to further. technologic advance. The right to
136. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003) (describing the written description, enablement, best mode, and
definiteness disclosure requirements to obtain a patent).
137. Id.
138. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
139. See Barash, supra note 130, at 698-700.
140. See Mueller, supra note 123, at 61-63.
141. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
142. Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 872 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) ("Indeed, in many areas of technology, technical information is not published
outside of patent documents.").
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conduct research [without royalty payment] to achieve such
knowledge need not, and should not, await expiration of the patent.
43
The public would be better served if this effort expended working around
patented technology was directed toward actual scientific progress and
innovation, thus exemplifying the purpose of the patent system. 144
The reformed patent system described in this section would undoubtedly
benefit the public due to increased innovation and scientific knowledge. In
addition, the reformed system would also affect individual patentees in a
manner they might at first perceive to be negative; however, a full evaluation
of the reformed system demonstrates that their rights would be respected and
protected.
C. Melding a Patentee's Compensation with Patent Law's Purpose
The benefits to science of the reformed system need to be weighed against
the potential negative effects this system may have on a patentee's rights and
interests. Following these proposals, congressional reform of the patent
infringement statute145 would undoubtedly weaken patent rights to some
degree; however, this does not necessarily mean that Congress should not take
this path. Rather, it begs the question of whether a patentee's interest in an
infallible right to exclude the nonprofit academic use of his patented
technology is worth the public cost incurred by hindering scientific progress.
The answer becomes apparent when the contours of a patentee's interest in a
right to exclude are explored.
First, a patentee does not have a valid interest in hindering public
scientific progress; rather, such an interest is antithetical to the purpose of
patent law.' 46 A patentee's right to exclude must be limited to commercial
uses that will allow the user to profit in some manner; that right must not
serve as a tool to hinder science. Notwithstanding lost royalties, patentees
suffer no financial loss if universities use patented technology to advance
pure, theoretical science because improved scientific theories generally have
no immediate commercial application in and of themselves. 147 Furthermore,
since abstract theoretical concepts are not patentable subject matter,
143. Id. at 873.
144. Id. "The purpose of a patent system is not only to provide a financial incentive to create
new knowledge and bring it to public benefit through new products; it also serves to add to the body
of published scientific/technologic knowledge." Id.
145. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2003) (defining patent infiingement).
146. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
147. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2003) (establishing patentable subject matter which does not include
abstract theoretical ideas).
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theoretical advances would not result in patents that render the patentee's
patent obsolete. 148  Allowing universities to freely conduct nonprofit
theoretical research using patented technology comports with the patent
system's goals of promoting science and compensating patentees for
commercial use of their patent149 because science would be advanced without
commercial use requiring compensation.
Second, the patentee has no legitimate interest in profiting from a
nonprofit university's use of his invention if the university never succeeds in
producing any economically useful inventions. While the university's
purpose for using patented technology may be to discover related new
innovations, until an economically useful invention results from the
university's efforts, the use is not actually commercial, but rather is a
philosophical inquiry. University research is based on a researcher's
hypothesis, that is, a researcher's philosophical notion that he can improve an
invention or make a new discovery. If the researcher uses patented
technology to pursue his hypothesis and his efforts result in a commercially
viable innovation, then his use of the patented technology was commercial
because it resulted in a commercial product. But if the researcher's
hypothesis fails, then the whole process was nothing more than a
philosophical inquiry because the end product was nothing more than an
intangible answer to his inquiry: that his hypothesis was incorrect.
Finally, a patentee does indeed have a valid interest in profiting from a
university's subsequent improvement of his invention that it achieved by
using his patented technology. When a university's use of patented
technology results in an improved, new, commercially useful product, a large
part of its success is based on the patentee's prior efforts. Patentees generally
must expend considerable time, money, and effort to develop new inventions
and also to prosecute patents protecting the inventions. 150  Therefore, a
patentee deserves some form of compensation for commercial innovations
that result from a university's use of his patented technology; however, the
compensation need not be front-end royalties as are now required, but rather
the patentee could fairly be compensated under the modified system using
"reach through" type royalties.
148. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 131 (3rd ed. 2003) (citing Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507
(1874)).
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
150. See generally Commission on Industrial Intellectual Property, Policy Statement: The
Reduction of Patent Costs (Jan. 30, 1997) (discussing the high costs associated with both worldwide
and United States patents), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/home/statements-rules/statements/
1997/patent costs.asp (last visited Sept. 2004).
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Fully evaluating the patentee's interest in an exclusionary right
demonstrates that the patent law should not sacrifice the benefit to society that
the modified system and an effective experimental use exception would
provide. Certainly a patentee deserves compensation when the use of his
patent leads another to further commercial gain. However, the costs to society
that result from not allowing free nonprofit experimental use are not justified.
The modified system balances the public's need for the patent laws to
promote science by providing for an effective experimental use exception for
nonprofit research while fairly compensating patentees with "reach-through"
type royalties. The modified system, accordingly, makes a patentee's
compensation for use of his invention consistent with the patent law purpose
of promoting science and innovation. 
51
V. CONCLUSION
Research partnerships among academia, private industry, and government
have evolved into effective methods of fostering innovation; however, recent
Federal Circuit decisions, most notably Madey, interpreting the experimental
use defense have imparted inefficiency and deterrents into the system.
Furthermore, theoretical research in particular receives short shrift by a
narrow interpretation of the experimental use defense because universities
may have less incentive to pursue abstract science that does not readily yield
immediate, commercially viable innovations.
The modified patent system presented in this Comment addresses these
issues and seeks to ground the patent laws within the purpose of patent law
elicited in the Constitution. It promotes both theoretical and innovative
research by expanding the scope of the experimental use defense to include
nonprofit research universities. While fostering science it also protects
deserving patentees by providing for "reach-through" type royalties only to
patentees whose patented technology directly contributed to advancing the
useful arts. The modified patent system starkly contrasts with the current
system where universities must pay royalties to all patentees, regardless of
whether their patents helped advance science. In sum, the current system's
lack of an effective experimental use defense undercuts the constitutional
purpose of patent law, whereas the modified patent system would allow
nonprofit academic research institutions to promote science, thereby fulfilling
the constitutional purpose of patent law.
JOSEPH MOHR
151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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